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Abstract. An agent normative society has to deal with two main con-
cerns: how to dene norms and how to enforce them. Enforcement be-
comes a complex issue as agent societies become more decentralized and
open. We propose a new distributed mechanism to enforce norms by os-
tracizing agents that do not abide by them. Our simulations have shown
that, although complete ostracism is not always possible, the mechanism
substantially reduces the number of norm violations.
1 Introduction
In a normative Multi-Agent System (MAS) a set of norms are added to restrict
the set of available actions in order to improve the coordination between agents.
An autonomous agent has the choice whether or not to support a norm. It is
up to the agent to decide if it is convenient for it to abide by it. For a utility
maximizer agent if following a norm is protable, it is in the agent's own interest
to act as the norm establishes. But this is not always the case, as some norms
are protable even when not all agents abide by them. For example, a norm that
dictates that owners must clean the common areas. Cleaning entails a cost, and
a clean area is a benet to all. If an owner does not clean the common area (i.e.,
a norm violator) thus not bearing its cost, but the others do, the area is still
clean.
The aim of this paper is to introduce a new distributed mechanism that at-
tains norm compliance by ostracizing norm violating agents. Our scenario allows
agents to interact with each other. An agent can interact with the agents it is
linked to directly or indirectly through a path of links (i.e., agents can interact
with direct neighbors, with neighbors of neighbors, and with their neighbors and
so on...). An initiator agent will search for a path in the society to nd a partner
agent with which to interact. All the agents in the path that are not the initiator
or the partner agent will be called mediator agents (i.e., agents mediating the
interaction).
We use a game-theoretic approach to interactions, which we model as a two-
player game with two possible strategies; cooperate and defect. The utility func-
tion will be that of a prisoner's dilemma (see Figure 1).
The norm in this scenario is for all agents to cooperate, thus attaining the
maximum utility for the society. Nonetheless, agents can choose to ignore thePD Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 3,3 0,5
Defect 5,0 1,1
Fig.1. Prisoner's Dilemma Payo Matrix
norm and defect (i.e., violate the norm) thus gaining more utility. In order to
attain norm enforcement, some agents (we will call them enforcer agents) are
given the ability to stop interacting with violators, and to stop them from inter-
acting with the enforcer's own neighbors. When enough agents use this ability
against a violator, it is ostracized. An agent is ostracized when it cannot interact
with anyone else in the society, in this case it is a consequence of defecting in
the interaction against many dierent agents.
The motivation behind using ostracism comes from the study of norm en-
forcement in primitive societies [11]. When a member of a community repeatedly
ignored its customs, it was forced to leave. No one in the community would inter-
act with the ostracized member from then on. Ostracism is achieved in human
societies through force and physical constraint. In order to achieve ostracism of
electronic entities, which interact through a network, we seek inspiration from
the network security area. The most commonly used component in this case is a
rewall, which blocks those communications which appear to be harmful. While
rewalls are usually set up by humans through complex rules, enforcer agents
will use gossip as a way to inform each other about malicious agents.
Fig.2. Ostracizing a violator
The ostracism process can be seen in Figure 2. At rst an undetected violator
in the network (the dark gray node) can interact with all the other agents (light
gray nodes are liable to interact with the violator). When the violator interacts,
and defects, it can be detected by enforcer agents which will block it (blacknodes are blocking agents, and white nodes are agents that the violator cannot
interact with). When all the violator's neighbors block it, it is ostracized.
Gossip is essential to nd out information about other agents in a distributed
environment. We will use gossip as part of the enforcement strategy to ostra-
cize agents. Information is gossiped only to agents mediating the interaction, to
minimize the amount or resources it takes. If agent agv violates the norm when
interacting with agent ag1, ag1 may spread this information to all mediator
agents so they may block agv in the future.
By running a set of simulations, we study under which conditions the mech-
anism works, and give measures of its success (such as the violations received or
the utility gained). Our hypotheses are:
{ H1 - Norm violations can be reduced by applying a local blocking rule.
{ H2 - The society's structure inuences its enforcement capabilities.
{ H3 - The choice of blocking strategy inuences the number of violations
received.
{ H4 - Enforcement makes norm-abiding a rational strategy.
Section 2 describes related work in the area of norm enforcement. Section
3 presents a detailed description of the scenario we employ in the simulations.
Section 4 describes the simulations and analyzes the resulting data. Finally,
section 5 presents future work.
2 Related Work
The problem of norm enforcement has been dealt with in human societies through
the study of law, philosophy, and the social sciences. Recently it is being dealt
with in computer science, where norms are studied as a coordination mechanism
for multi-agent systems. Axelrod [1] rst dealt with the application of norms
from an evolutionary perspective. Enforcement is seen by Axelrod as a sort of
meta-norm to punish agents that do not punish violators. The norm game is of-
ten modeled as an N-Player Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma [1,8]. In these cases the
norm is to cooperate and ways are sought to ensure that agents prefer coopera-
tion. Other research studies norms that avoid aggression or theft [4,7,12,15]. In
these cases agents gain utility by either nding items or receiving them as gifts.
But these items can be stolen by other agents through aggression. An agent that
abides by the possession norms will not steal food possessed by another agent,
therefore avoiding aggression.
Two enforcement strategies have been studied to attain norm compliance:
the use of power to change the utilities through sanctions or rewards [2,3,8,
14], and the spread of normative reputation in order to avoid interaction with
violators [4,6,7,12,15]. Both strategies have the goal of making norm adopters
better o than norm violators. But this is not always accomplished [4,7], since
all agents benet from the norm while only enforcers agents bear its cost.
Norm enforcement models in [2,6] show how violating the norm becomes an
irrational strategy when punishment is possible. But these models assume thefollowing: (i) agents are able to monitor other agents' activities; and (ii) agents
have the ability to inuence the resulting utility of interactions. Assumption
(i) can be materialized by having a central agent mediate all interactions [2],
or by having agents recognize violators through direct interaction with them,
or through gossip with other agents [4]. The rst solution does not scale, since
the mediator agent would be overwhelmed in a large system. The second scales
because no agent is the enforcement bottleneck, but it is less ecient since in
a distributed environment not all violations can be detected. Assumption (ii)
can be carried out through third-party enforcement [2], or self-enforcement [6]
in which each agent carries out sanctions to agents it interacts with. Third party
does not scale since it can easily be overwhelmed in a large system. For self-
enforcement, all agents must have the ability to aect the outcome utility of
interactions.
Axelrod [1] denes the \shadow of the future" as a mechanism to aect an
agent's choice in iterated games. An agent is deterred from defecting when the
probability of interacting with the same agent in the future is high, and agents
will defect in future interactions with known violators. Nonetheless, this mech-
anism makes enforcers violate the norm as they also defect. Another method is
the threat of ostracism or physical constraint. By not interacting with violators,
an agent can interact with another agent and achieve a higher payo. Younger
has studied [15] the possibility of avoiding interaction with norm-violators, but
does not prevent norm-violators from interacting with anyone else.
Kittock [9] was the rst to study how the structure of a multi agent system
aected the emergence of a social norm. He studied regular graphs, hierarchies,
and trees. In [5] Delgado studied emergence in complex graphs such as scale-free
and small-world, and in [10] studied the relationship between a graph's clustering
factor and emergence.
Using the scenario presented in this paper, agents can monitor other agents'
activities, and inuence future interactions. The spread gossip, and sanctioning
norm-violators with ostracism via blockage are the techniques used to achieve
this inuence. We have studied norm enforcement using these techniques in
societies with diering structures.
3 The Scenario
We model our multi-agent system as an undirected, irreexive graph: MAS =
hAg;Reli, where Ag is the set of vertices and Rel the set of edges. Each vertex
models an agent and each edge between two vertices denotes that the agents are
linked to each other. We have chosen three kinds of graphs for their signicance:
Tree, Random, and Small-World. We dene a tree as a graph in which each
node has one parent and some number of children; one node, the root node,
has no parent, and the leave nodes have no children. Nodes are linked to their
parents and children. In a random graph any node can be linked to any other
one with a given probability. A small-world graph is created by starting with aregular graph1, and adding enough random edges to make the average distance
between any two vertices signicantly smaller [13]. A small-world graph is highly
clustered (i.e., if a node has two neighbors, the probability of them being linked
is high), and there are some links between distant parts of the graph that make
the average distance between any two edges small. The graph structures have
been generated with a similar average number of links per node.
We use a game-theoretic approach by modeling interactions as a two-player
prisoner's dilemma game. The norm is that agents ought to cooperate (i.e., an
agent disobeys the norm by defecting). In order for two agents to interact, there
must be a path in the graph between the two. One agent will search for a path
that leads to another agent with which to interact. We call the searching agent
initiator agent, the agent chosen to interact partner agent, and the remaining
agents in the path mediator agents. The partner nding process is explained
below, but rst we need to formally describe some terms.
We dene the set of neighbors of an agent ai as the set of agents it is linked
to directly in the graph: N(ai) = faj 2 Ag j (ai;aj) 2 Relg. Each agent also has
a set of agents it blocks (an agent cannot block itself ): B(ai)  Ag n faig. An
agent ai can query another agent aj for a list of its neighbors. We call the set
of agents that aj returns, reported neighbors: RN(ai;aj)  N(aj). The set of
reported neighbors depends on the blocking strategy of aj. The strategies used in
our simulations are explained below. A path is the route (without cycles) in the
graph structure through which interaction messages are delivered. We represent
a path as a nite (ordered) sequence of agents p = [a1;a2;:::;an] such that for
all i with 1  i  n   1 and n  2 we have that ai+1 2 N(ai), and for all i;j
with 1  i;j  n and i 6= j we have that ai 6= aj. The agent a1 of a path is the
initiator agent, agent an is the partner agent, the remaining ones are mediator
agents.
In order to nd a partner, the initiator agent ai creates a path p = [ai]
with itself as the only agent in it. A path with one agent is not valid, since an
agent cannot interact with itself. Therefore, the initiator agent will query the last
agent in the path (the rst time it will be itself) to give it a list of its neighbors.
It will choose one of them randomly2 (aj) and add it to the end of the path
p = [ai;:::;aj]. At this point, if agent aj allows it, the initiator agent can choose
agent aj as the partner. Otherwise, it can query agent aj for its neighbors and
continue searching for a partner. This choice is taken randomly, with probability
p = 0:3 aj becomes the partner, and with probability 1 p it becomes a mediator
and ai asks it for its neighbors.
If the path's last element is an agent an that refuses to interact with the
initiator agent, and an returns an empty list of agents when queried for its
neighbors, backtracking is applied. Agent an is removed and a dierent agent is
chosen from the list of an 1's neighbors and added to the end of the list.
1 CN;r is a regular graph on N vertices such that vertex i is adjacent to vertices
(i + j) mod N and (i   j) mod N for 1  j  r.
2 To avoid loops, an agent that is already part of the path cannot be chosen again.Once the partner is chosen, a prisoner's dilemma game is played between the
initiator and the partner. The game results and the path are known by both
playing agents. Playing agents can choose to send the game results to all the
mediators in the path. This is what we call gossip, which formally speaking is
a tuple that contains the agents' names and their strategy choices for the given
game: Gossip = hagi;chi;agj;chji, where chi and chj are either cooperate or
defect.
During the whole process agents can execute any of the following actions:
{ Return a list of neighboring agents when asked for its neighbors.
{ Accept, or reject, an oer to interact.
{ Choose a strategy to play in the PD game when interacting.
{ Inform mediators of the outcome of the interaction.
The society of agents is composed of three types of agents, each one charac-
terized by a dierent strategy for the actions it can execute. A meek agent is a
norm-abiding agent that always cooperates. It will always return all its neighbors
to any agent that asks. A meek agent will always accept an oer to interact, it
will always cooperate in the PD game, and it will never gossip. A violator agent
follows the strategy of a meek agent, except that it always defects when playing
a game, therefore it is not a norm-abiding agent. Violator agents in our simula-
tions are very naive, they never model the other agents, or treat them dierently
depending on their actions. In short, they cannot change the strategies. Future
work will look into more sosticated norm-violators.
Finally, an enforcer agent has the ability to block violators, which is essential
in order to achieve their ostracism. An enforcer agent shares the same strategies
with meek agents with the following exceptions: It will add agents that have
defected against it to its set of blocked agents, and will gossip to all mediators
when defections happen. If an enforcer is informed of the results of a game it
was mediating, it will act as if it had played the game itself. An enforcer agent
will never choose an agent in its blocked set as a partner, and will not allow
an agent in its blocked set to choose it as a partner. Therefore, a violator agent
cannot interact with an enforcer who is blocking it. When an enforcer agent am
is asked to return a list of its neighbors by an agent ai who is not in its blocked
set, two dierent strategies are possible. The Uni-Directional Blockage (UDB)
strategy, where all its neighbors will be returned (RN(ai;am) = N(am)). Or the
Bi-Directional Blockage (BDB) strategy, where only those neighbors not in its
blocked set are returned (RN(ai;am) = N(am) n B(am)). When the querying
agent is in the enforcer agent's blocked set, it always returns an empty set.
The choice of enforcement strategy entails a trade o. Intuitively, one can
see that enforcer agents are better o with the UDB strategy, since they will
be able to use violator agents as mediators to reach other parts of the society.
Enforcers will not be tricked by a violator more than once, so they are sure not
to interact with them. Therefore, using violators as mediators benets enforcers.
Meek agents, on the other hand, do not learn to avoid violators. They may
choose one unknowingly as their partner repeatedly. BDB is a better strategy for
meek agents, it reduces their chances of choosing violator agents. Furthermore, astructure with a violator as a cut vertex, may be split into two dierent societies
when the BDB strategy is used, and the violator is ostracized. If the UDB
strategy is used, the society stays connected, since the ostracized violator can
stil be used as a mediator.
In order to focus on the most relevant aspects in our simulations, we made
the following limiting assumptions:
{ Agents cannot change their strategy (i.e., a violator is always a violator).
{ Agents cannot lie when sending gossip.
{ There are no corrupt enforcer agents.
{ There is no noise (i.e., an agent knows its opponent's chosen strategy).
These assumptions imply that modeling agents' reputation is simple. Being in-
formed once about an agent's strategy is enough, since information will never
be contradictory. Therefore, there is no place for forgiveness, and sanctions are
indenite. Relaxation of these assumptions will be studied in future work.
4 Simulations
The simulations have been run using the scenario specied in Section 3. Each
simulation consists of a society of 100 agents. The society will go through 1000
rounds, in a round each agent tries to nd a partner with which to interact. If
the agent nds a partner a prisoner's dilemma with the utility function of Figure
1 is played.
The parameters that can be set in each simulation are:
{ Percentage of Violators (V) - from 10% to 90% in 10% increments.
{ Percentage of Enforcers (E) - from 0% to 100% in 10% increments3.
{ Type of Graph (G) - either tree, small world, or random.
{ Enforcement Type (ET) - Uni-Directional Blockage (UDB), or Bi-Directional
Blockage (BDB).
An exhaustive set of simulations have been run with all the possible values
for each parameter. Each simulation has been run 50 times in order to obtain
an accurate average value. The metrics that have been extracted are: the mean
violations received per agent, and the mean utility gained per agent. The metrics
have been calculated for the whole society and for each agent type. The data
gathered from the simulations supports our hypotheses.
(H1) Norm violations can be reduced by applying a local blocking
rule. The graph in Figure 3(a) shows that the higher the percentage of norm-
abiding agents that use a blocking rule, the lower the average number of norm
violations received by any agent in our system. There are ve dierent lines in
the graph, each one stands for a dierent percentage of violating agents. In all
cases a higher enforcer to meek agent ratio (x-axes) leads to lower violations
3 The percentage of meek agents is computed through the following formula: M =
100%   V   E. Therefore, V + E cannot be more than 100%.received in average by any agent (y-axes). When the ratio of enforcers is high,
violators end up interacting with each other. Therefore, the y-axes measures the
violations received by \any" agent, the reduction in violations in Figure 3(a)
is not signicant. The data referring to the violations received only by norm-
abiding agents shows a larger reduction (see Figure 3(b)). Enforcer agents can
perceive a norm violation at most once per violator agent. But if we look at the
violations received by meek agents, we see that they experience an increment
of violations when the ratio of enforcers is high (see Figure 7(a)). This means
that enforcer agents have blocked violator agents, which are forced to interact
with the small number of meek agents left unprotected. Since the meek are a
small portion of the norm supporters, this does not inuence the total violations
perceived by norm supporters as a whole. Therefore, the higher the ratio of
enforcer agents, the lower the average of violations perceived by norm-abiding
agents.
(a) all agents (b) norm-abiding agents
Fig.3. Local blocking rule reduces violations
(H2) The society's structure inuences its enforcement capabili-
ties. It is also seen from the data that dierent organizational structures in the
multi-agent system inuence norm enforcement. In Figure 4(a) and 4(b) we have
extracted the average norm violations (y-axes) for each of the dierent structures
tested: Random, Small World, and Tree. We have only shown the simulations
where violator agents account for 10% and 20% of the population, therefore at
most there will be 90% or 80% of enforcers, respectively. The x-axes contains the
dierent percentages of enforcer agents tested. It can be seen that both random
and small world networks have an almost identical graph line. On the other hand
the tree structure has shown to improve the enforcement capabilities. The main
dierence between a tree and the other structures studied is that in a tree there
is only one path between any two agents. In random and small world graphs,
many paths can be usually found between any two agents.
(H3) The choice of blocking strategy inuences the number of viola-
tions received. The data in Figure 5 supports this hypothesis. The x-axes shows(a) 10% violators (b) 20% violators
Fig.4. Enforcement capabilities vary depending on structure
the enforcer to meek agent ratio. The y-axes contains a metric for the increment
in eciency at protecting meek agents from violations. Eciency is the dierence
(calculated in percentage) in violations received by meek agents for each of the
two dierent enforcement strategies E = ((VUDB=VBDB)   1)  100. E cal-
culates the increase in violations received by agents when using uni-directional
blockage in respect to bi-directional blockage.
Figure 5 shows that for random and small world networks the eciency is
positively correlated with the enforcer to meek agent ratio. We can conclude
that Bi-Directional Blockage has a higher eciency at protecting meek agents
from violator agents. This is not observed in the tree network. In this case
the eciency stays along the 0% line with some deviations. We argue that in
networks organized as trees, the choice of enforcement strategy does not have
a signicant inuence in the outcome. The tree network is already good for
ostracizing oenders, and the blockage strategy does not improve it.
Fig.5. Enforcement strategy inuences received violations(H4) Enforcement makes norm-abiding a rational strategy. This
hypothesis is supported by the utility gained by agents. A strategy is rational
if it maximizes the agent's utility. What has been tested is whether following
the norm maximizes the agent's utility, and in which conditions. Figure 6(a)
shows the utility gained (y-axes) by norm supporting agents, its x-axes shows
the enforcer to meek agent ratio. Figure 6(b) instead shows the utility gained
by norm violating agents. In both gures each line represents the amount of
violating agents in the system. As the number of enforcers increases there is a
tendency for norm supporters to gain more utility, while the opposite tendency
is observed for violator agents. When the number of enforcer agents is low, the
utility gained by violator agents is much higher than the one gained by norm
supporters. As the number of enforcer agents grows the roles are reversed. The
inection point depends on the amount of violator agents in the system. For
simulations with 10% of violator agents, supporting the norm becomes rational
when the enforcer to meek ratio is higher than 1:25. For simulations with 50%
of violator agents, the ratio needs to be higher than 0:7. The rest of simulations
have inection points between those two values.
(a) norm-abiding agents (b) norm-violating agents
Fig.6. Utility gained by norm-abiding
It is interesting to note that even though meek agents receive more violations
as the number of enforcer agents grows (see Figure 7(a)), the utility gained by
them surprisingly increases (see Figure 7(b)). This is due to the fact that meek
agents are still able to interact with other norm-abiding agents. Since violators
are being blocked the ratio of defection to cooperation is lowered and the utility
is increased.
5 Future Work
This paper is part of ongoing research on norm enforcement. Future work will
relax the set of assumptions about agents, by giving them the ability to change(a) Violations Received (b) Utility gained
Fig.7. Local blocking rule increases both utility and violations to meek agents
their strategies in time, to lie, and to allow enforcer agents to violate the norm
(i.e., corrupt enforcers). The assumption of perfect information will be relaxed
by adding uncertainty and noise. For these cases elaborate gossip techniques and
reputation management will allow agents to enforce the norm. In future work the
agent's reputation will be modeled not through gossip but through interaction
overhearing. Mediating agents could overhear the interactions instead of waiting
for interacting agents to report the outcome. More so, other conservative blocking
strategies can be studied; such as blocking o agents that mediate norm violators,
or blocking agents until they are shown to be norm-abiders.
Furthermore, the impact of other network parameters and dynamic networks
will be analyzed. New links between agents could be added dynamically and test
how this aects norm enforcement. New enforcement techniques will be studied
to take advantage of dynamic networks.
Finally, other studies have shown that the eciency of enforcement dimin-
ishes when enforcement conveys a cost to the enforcing agent [1,8]. In future
work there will be cost associated to blockage. One way to associate cost to en-
forcers is by removing their ability to stop agents from interacting with them. In
this case, enforcers can withhold information from known violators, but if asked
will have to interact with them and endure the norm violation.
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